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INTRODUCTION
After a long day at the office, Carl Chicago comes home to spend
a few minutes catching up on world events courtesy of CNN.
Settling into the couch cushion, he turns on the TV, only to find the
network blacked out. A message from his cable provider, Comcast,
tells him that it is currently disputing its agreement with the
station, and gives him a number to call to register his complaint.
Carl is undeterred, and decides that he would rather just kick back
with Finn and Jake on Adventure Time instead. But as he turns to
Cartoon Network for some much-needed entertainment, he runs in-
to a similar message from his cable provider. Carl, growing increas-
ingly frustrated, decides to call his sister in Virginia, Wendy
Williamsburg, who can see both of the stations fine. Carl begins
complaining to her about the amount he pays for stations he cannot
even access. “Well how much do you pay?” she asks. Carl tells her
he pays about $75 per month for the standard expanded cable.
Wendy checks her own bill. Up until about a year ago, she had been
paying roughly the same amount, around $76.50 or so. However, for
the same package of channels, she notices she is now paying almost
$84. “How can this be?” she asks Carl, wondering why his enormous
cable conglomerate can offer such lower prices than hers. “Don’t ask
me,” Carl retorts, “I didn’t pick them.” 
Carl, as well as most of his neighbors and friends throughout the
country, did not choose his cable company. That is because most
localities have only one cable provider, and although there were
previously hundreds, if not thousands, of different cable companies
nationwide, most people today are served by one of only a few na-
tional conglomerates. More concerning than this lack of competition
is that federal regulators at the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have sanctioned this situation
by choosing to measure a cable company’s growth only in individual
markets, potentially ignoring nationwide gains. 
The merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable would
have been the largest merger of two cable providers in history.1
1. See Comcast and Time Warner Cable Transaction Fact Sheet, COMCAST, http://
corporate.comcast.com/images/Transaction-Fact-Sheet-2-13-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3RZ-
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Before Comcast abandoned its plans after the tepid reaction of both
the DOJ and the Federal Communications Comminsion (FCC),2 the
merger garnered substantial consumer opposition3 and concerned
policy analysts and economists over the power such a large company
would have.4 The cable industry began as a collection of small con-
glomerates serving one or a few localities,5 until providers began to
combine.6 There are now only about seven companies serving most
of the cable-using public nationwide, of which the four largest are
Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Cox Communications, and Charter
Communications.7 
When companies merge, they must submit notice of the merger
to the federal government.8 Either the DOJ Antitrust Division or
the FTC Bureau of Competition investigates the merger,9 and then
either approves it or sues to block it.10 Regulators determine the
CFMT] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
2. Shalini Ramachandran, Comcast Kills Time Warner Cable Deal, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24,
2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/comcast-kills-time-warner-cable-deal-1429878881
[http://perma.cc/3CNE-MWN5].
3. David Ingram, Americans Take Dim View of Comcast, Time Warner Cable Deal,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2014, 1:04 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/26/us-usa-
antitrust-idUSBREA2P0BD20140326 [http://perma.cc/9ZJ9-7A6V]. 
4. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, How the U.S. Could Block the Comcast/Time Warner Cable
Merger, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/
how-the-us-could-block-the-comccasttime-warner-cable-merger [http://perma.cc/VK2B-24TQ];
Art Brodsky, 7 Ways the Feds Can Make a Comcast-Time Warner Merger Less Terrible, WIRED
(Apr. 19, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/7-limits-the-fcc-should-impose-on-a-
comcast-time-warner-merger/ [http://perma.cc/EKH5-HC62]; Warren Grimes, Competition
Will Not Survive the Comcast-Time Warner Merger, FORBES OP. (Feb. 27, 2014, 10:59 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/02/27/competition-will-not-survive-the-comcast-
time-warner-merger/ [http://perma.cc/FSD2-FE7L].
5. See The Cable History Project, CABLE CTR., http://www.cablecenter.org/cable-history/
108-the-cable-history-project-overview.html [http://perma.cc/ZWP3-PNPY] (last visited Sept.
27, 2015). 
6. See United States: Cable Television, MUSEUM OF BROAD. COMMC’NS, http://www.
museum.tv/eotv/unitedstatesc.htm [http://perma.cc/AR5L-4F3T] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
7. Press Release, Major Pay-TV Providers Lost About 150,000 Subscribers in 3Q 2014,
Leichtman Research Grp. (Nov. 14, 2014), www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/111414release.
html [http://perma.cc/UF9U-TPYR] [hereinafter Leichtman Research Grp.].
8. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (1976).
9. Id. § 18a(b)(1)(A).
10. The FCC also reviews telecommunications (telco) mergers for possible effects on the
telco market and the provision of services to consumers. Not only is FCC analysis usually
duplicative of DOJ/FTC analysis, see Laura Kaplan, Note, One Merger, Two Agencies: Dual
Review in the Breakdown of the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger and a Proposal for Reform, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1571, 1573-74 (2012), but it is frequently rejected by courts as being arbitrary and
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potential anticompetitive effects of mergers by turning to ratios of
companies’ market shares11 to predict the effect a merger will have
on all other sellers in that market.12 If the analysis shows the com-
panies’ merger would have anticompetitive effects, regulators gener-
ally sue to block the merger.13 The argument between the merging
companies and regulators is always over which market regulators
measure.14 Unlike most industries, in which the merger effects are
measured nationally, the DOJ/FTC measures a cable merger for its
local impacts, looking at whether it will decrease competition in
Richmond, Virginia, as opposed to competition on a national scale.15
Most markets have only one cable provider,16 so Comcast and Time
Warner Cable, for instance, do not compete in any market nation-
wide.17 In fact, very few cable companies share territory nation-
wide.18 Theoretically, the DOJ should have approved the Comcast-
Time Warner Cable merger on the grounds that it would not have
capricious when it departs from DOJ/FTC analysis. See infra Part III.A.
11. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18-19 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/
atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010#5c [http://perma.cc/272R-8DT6] [hereinafter HORI-
ZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (describing use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to
measure the market).
12. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 19 (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014); see also infra Part I.B.1.
13. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 12.
14. Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defin-
ing Markets and Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 6, 7
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (explaining that merging companies often define their market
broadly, while the federal government often defines it more narrowly, each of them implicitly
negotiating over the impact of the merger on the market).
15. Why the Feds Won’t Be Able to Block a Comcast-Time Warner Merger, FORTUNE MAG.
(Feb. 13, 2014, 5:36 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/02/13/why-the-feds-wont-be-able-to-block-a-
comcast-time-warner-merger/ [http://perma.cc/2XW8-9S32].
16. Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises as Barriers to Video Competition, 12 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 2, 10 (2007). This is so because cable is a “natural monopoly,” where a market with
a single provider is more economically efficient than one with multiple providers. See infra
Part I.A.1 (explaining the concept of a natural monopoly).
17. Comcast and Time Warner Cable in Top 50 TV Markets, CNN MONEY, http://money.
cnn.com/infographic/news/comcast-time-warner-coverage-map/ [http://perma.cc/LV3P-VW5C]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
18. See, e.g., Zachary M. Seward, The Charts and Maps You Need to Understand Why
Charter is Buying Time Warner Cable and Bright House, QUARTZ (May 25, 2015), http://qz.
com/411712/the-charts-and-maps-you-need-to-understand-why-charter-is-buying-time-warner-
cable-and-bright-house/ [http://perma.cc/9CNU-E3KZ].
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decreased competition in any localities.19 Where there is no competi-
tion to begin with,20 a merger cannot make competition worse.21 
While this may be the case on a theoretical level, the problem is
that a cable company’s national power does matter. The cable mar-
ket is two-sided: a cable company negotiates nationally with pro-
gramming companies to buy their content, and then sells it to
consumers in localities.22 A cable company with sufficient power na-
tionwide could decide that it is tired of paying $5.54 per month per
customer for ESPN23 and, because of its size, have a substantial
ability to extract lower prices from ESPN.24 ESPN would then have
to either decrease operations or, to the extent it can, use its own
power over smaller cable companies to extract higher fees from
customers.
Programming companies’ ordinary response in this situation
would be to merge.25 However, they cannot do so without raising
19. Geoffrey Manne, Why the Antitrust Realities Support the Comcast-Time Warner
Merger, TRUTH ON THE MKT. (Apr. 14, 2014), http://truthonthemarket.com/2014/04/14/why-
the-antitrust-realities-support-the-comcast-time-warner-cable-merger [http://perma.cc/VSG8-
D2G6]. Although then-Attorney General Eric Holder indicated that the DOJ was considering
suing to block the Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger, it was ultimately the FCC’s indication
that it would seek to frustrate merger plans that caused Comcast to abandon its attempt. See
Ramachandran, supra note 2.
20. Although satellite and telco rivals provide alternatives in some localities, the discus-
sion in Part III will demonstrate why these are not effective sources of competition in the long
term.
21. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Crossing the Rubicon: Why the Comcast/Time
Warner Cable Merger Should Be Blocked 1-2 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies, Research Paper
No. 245, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422868 [http://perma.cc/
88Z6-XDGG].
22. Andre Boik, Intermediaries in Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S.
Cable Television Industry 2 (Univ. of Toronto, Working Paper, 2013), http://kelley.iu.edu/
BEPP/documents/boik%20paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/82KG-KWCV].
23. L.A. Ross & Tony Maglio, Your Unfair Cable Bill: Most Expensive Channels Aren’t the
Most Watched, THE WRAP (Mar. 13, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/cable-bill-battle-
subscribers-providers-carriage-fees/ [http://perma.cc/5542-DM66] (using data compiled by SNL
Kagan).
24. Meg James, Comcast-Time Warner Cable Merger Is No Longer Viewed as Inevitable,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/
la-et-ct-comcast-time-warner-cable-merger-opposition-20150127-story.html#page=1 [http://
perma.cc/Y3WY-ZN95] (describing discussions between federal investigators and heads of
programming companies expressing concerns that Comcast can use its power to undercut how
much programming companies are paid for their channels).
25. BARBARA S. PETITT & KENNETH R. FERRIS, VALUATION FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
6-7 (2d ed. 2013). 
2015] MEASURING MONOPSONY 305
significant antitrust concerns of their own, because regulators
measure them—as they do companies in most industries—on a
national level.26 Programming companies are thus roughly stuck in
place while a sufficiently large cable company, which is unfettered
by the current enforcement scheme, can theoretically obtain un-
precedented power to dictate prices to programmers, leaving the
programmers to pass costs on to other cable companies’ customers,
like Wendy Williamsburg. This may have seemed unlikely until the
proposed Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger, which would have
made the two largest cable companies one. Even though that merger
was scuttled, the immediate presence of another buyer for Time
Warner Cable—Charter, the fourth-largest company—indicates that
this merger activity will likely continue.27
Government regulators, however, have a little-used tool in their
antitrust toolbox to measure buyer power in the market. This Note
proposes that government regulators measure potential mergers for
monopsony power—the ability of a single buyer to impact a would-
be seller in a market—to ensure that they consider all economic
effects of any future cable mergers.28 Although monopsony has never
been applied to the cable industry, the economic realities support
dusting off this doctrine and putting it to work. This Note analyzes
the abandoned Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger, which, as a
proposed merger between the two largest cable providers in the
country, put these issues front and center for regulators for the first
time. Although the parties abandoned that merger, Charter Com-
munications’ proposed merger with Time Warner Cable would
enlarge the merged company to almost the same size as Comcast.29
These issues remain prevalent, as the future of cable seems to pro-
mise more of such activity.
26. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (describing a proposed merger between
two programming companies in the wake of the Comcast-Time Warner Cable announcement,
which raised substantial antitrust concerns that would have needed to be addressed before
the merger could have proceeded).
27. See Sydney Ember, In Time Warner Cable Deal, Charter Seeks National Heft, N.Y.
TIMES (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/business/media/in-cable-deal-
charter-seeks-its-legitimacy.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/32SZ-HDFB].
28. The monopsonist can dictate terms to its suppliers. Consequently, if federal regulators
determine that a cable merger might create monopsony power, they will be able to effectively
curtail this growth as they have not been able to do before. See infra Part III.B.
29. See Ember, supra note 27.
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Part I of this Note discusses the history and goals of cable reg-
ulation, including why conglomerates are traditionally allowed, and
how programming companies are measured differently than cable
companies. Part II examines the problems with measuring cable
market-to-market. It begins by explaining how and why this
structure does not check the size of cable providers, and how courts
have eliminated prior rules. The only reasonable market solution to
cable power is programming power, and if their mergers are blocked
under standard antitrust doctrine, regulators may have inadver-
tently enshrined cable dominance over programming and consum-
ers. This Part also discusses the potential losers in a large-scale
cable merger. 
Finally, Part III argues that, although other regulators have
failed to stop cable’s unchecked growth, antitrust laws should have
more success. This Note proposes that the DOJ Antitrust Division
and FTC30 be required to measure both sides of the cable mar-
ket—the influence of cable both market-to-market via consumer
delivery, and the nationwide effects on programming purchasing via
monopsony power. If either of these raises the concentration of the
market beyond the established antitrust thresholds, the DOJ should
sue to block the merger. This proposal will allow more robust
consumer protection, uphold a free market, and keep cable compa-
nies from shifting economic equity towards themselves and away
from their customers and competitors. The proposal also squares
with the purpose of the antitrust laws, which should vest the
authority to change their market analysis within the DOJ and FTC
without their rules being struck down by the courts. This Part will
also address alternatives, explaining why this proposal is more sus-
tainable than others.
30. This Note applies to both the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC, but because the
DOJ considered the Comcast-Time Warner merger, this Note makes shorthand references to
the DOJ.
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I. CABLE’S REGULATORY TRADITION: MEASURING COMPETITION
MARKET-TO-MARKET
A. Cable as a Natural Monopoly
Two concepts in economics, efficiency31 and equity,32 are usually
in tension with one another in regulators’ calculations of economic
policy. In the case of cable franchises, both of these actually work in
tandem to establish cable as a “natural monopoly,” where the best
solution is a single provider in a locality. As a result, most localities
in the United States are served by only one cable company.33 These
concepts are explored in detail below. 
1. Efficiency: The Cheapest Good for the Greatest Number
Cable, as a natural monopoly, validates efficiency concerns. Like
other utilities, cable is the almost quintessential example of a nat-
ural monopoly, meaning that the most efficient market exists when
only one provider serves a locality.34 Because a cable system
requires large capital expenditures up front to install coaxial cable
and other equipment to transmit a cable signal,35 the cost for each
consumer decreases as it is amortized over increasing numbers of
31. Economic efficiency is the requirement that the market maximizes producer and con-
sumer surplus—in other words, that producers sell the product for as low as possible, and that
the maximum number of consumers willing to buy at that price are able to buy at that price.
Put in more basic, non-economic terms, this intuitively means that the most people are made
the most happy, as far as happiness can be measured through economic systems. See AVINASH
DIXIT, MICROECONOMICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 52-55 (2014).
32. Equity, as used in this Note, refers to the economic concept of equity, rather than
ownership of a company. Economic equity describes how the benefits buyers and sellers get
from competition accrue to each party (in other words, are they equal, or does one party
benefit more than others?). See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
33. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 70 (1996); see also Reza Dibadj, Toward
Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond the Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 245, 265 (2003) (citing FCC data that only 2 percent of “cable community units”
have more than one provider nationwide, and noting that only one in twenty customers re-
sponding to a Consumer Reports survey reported having a choice among more than one cable
option).
34. Shaun Christensen, Cable Television: Competition and the First Amendment, 37 S.D.
L. REV. 566, 576-77 (1992).
35. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 535 (4th ed. 2005).
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customers.36 Consequently, if two or more companies were to com-
pete head-to-head, installing their own different sets of coaxial cable
and equipment, they would have to amortize their costs over fewer
consumers.37 This would raise the cost of doing business for each
company, and raise the price for consumers, to a point at which the
price would be too high for consumers to pay and the costs too great
for the companies to bear.38 Efficiency considerations thus dictate
that only one cable company exist in order to spread these capital
expenditures among the highest number of customers, ensuring the
lowest possible price for those customers.39 Most local governments
thus aim to have only one cable provider, and they have been fairly
successful in that regard.40
2. Equity: Providing the Local Voice
Equity considerations have also guided federal regulators to a
natural monopoly. The courts have long supported the FCC’s de-
cision to favor consumer equity41 over economic efficiency.42 The
earliest of these decisions, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v.
FCC, upheld an FCC rule prohibiting an outside corporation from
importing its own offerings, delivered via microwave and providing
better service than the local cable provider, because it “would result
in the ‘demise’ of the local television station ... and the loss of service
to a substantial rural population not served by the community an-
tenna systems.”43 The court upheld the rule as a proper exercise of
the FCC’s regulatory power.44 This decision is important because
36. Id. 
37. For instance, if a company spends $1,000,000 to start, and can sell to 100,000 custo-
mers in an area, their bill is $10 (plus the ongoing costs of the cable company, profit, and so
on). If two companies compete and each win half of the customers, they have each still spent
$1,000,000, but now only sell to 50,000 customers. Those customers pay an additional $10,
which might make them less likely to buy cable. 
38. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 35, at 535.
39. Id.
40. See generally Dibadj, supra note 33; infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra note 32 (explaining the concept of equity).
42. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 362-63. The court upheld the decision despite the fact that the FCC’s duties
include considering both equity and efficiency concerns: “Relevant, too, is the congressional
mandate that the Commission ‘make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, ... and of power
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pure efficiency, which reigns in most laissez-faire markets, would
dictate that the government allow this arguably superior competitor
to thrive because it could provide citizens with a better product than
their local provider.45 
Economic theory most often presumes that lower prices make for
the best civic good.46 The FCC’s rule, and the Carter Mountain
court’s imprimatur, indicates a continuing desire by social planners
to protect decisions that may actually cost consumers more money
or provide worse service in order to keep a local voice in the commu-
nity.47 Regulators have long taken the view that cable’s provision of
the local voice vindicates a consumer right. Cable came into exis-
tence because not all communities received adequate broadcast
signal48—the towns in Carter Mountain were Wyoming mountain
towns that otherwise did not have strong television signals.49 In
exchange for cable companies incurring the substantial up-front
fixed costs for laying the infrastructure necessary to provide cable
service,50 local government franchising authorities that dictate
which firms are allowed to broadcast in a certain area granted them
exclusive access to municipal rights of way.51 
among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distri-
bution of ... service to each of the same.’” Id. (emphasis added). This same impulse guides the
“must-carry” provisions imposed by the FCC on local providers, which mandates that cable
companies carry the local broadcast stations and their news media, even if they could execute
a cheaper arrangement with a non-local news station. Interview with Brian Hendricks, Head
of Tech. Policy & Gov’t Relations N. Am., Nokia, in Williamsburg, Va. (May 5, 2014).
45. Economic equity, on the other hand, considers what each of the buyers and sellers
gets—in this case, the local voice is “worth paying for,” even though each party gets a lower
total surplus because they could have obtained a product for cheaper, and, as discussed in
supra note 31, is what makes buyers “happiest” in economic theory. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON
& WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 38 (16th ed. 1998) (discussing the macroeconomic
objectives of “promoting efficiency, achieving a fairer distribution of income, and pursuing
macroeconomic objectives of economic growth and stability”).
46. Efficiency, ECON. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/ Effi-
ciency.html [http://perma.cc/WY4K-C3KE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (defining alternative
efficiency).
47. Interview with John Michael Parman, Assistant Professor, Dep’t of Econ., College of
William & Mary, in Williamsburg, Va. (Mar. 17, 2014); see also DANA ROYAL ULLOTH, COM-
MUNICATION TECHNOLOGY: A SURVEY 82-85 (1992). 
48. Evolution of Cable Television, FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/
evolution-cable-television [http://perma.cc/ZF3F-GQEV] (last updated Mar. 14, 2012).
49. Carter Mountain, 321 F.2d at 361. 
50. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 35, at 535. 
51. Id.
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These barriers persist today, partially because of franchising pro-
tection.52 Cable companies often enjoy solicitous relationships with
their local franchising authorities.53 In addition, the cost of “over-
building”54 on existing cable lines effectively stymies competitors
and raises their marginal cost for adding customers, because addi-
tional customers usually only come from the existing customer
base.55 As a result, 98 percent of municipalities are served by only
one cable provider.56 The fact that cable is considered a natural
monopoly, and the policy desire embodied in Carter Mountain to
reward franchises, combine to keep competition low.
B. History of Cable Regulation and Deregulation
1. Cable Regulation
Though cable may have started as a small market characterized
by a loose federation of local franchises, it is now quite different.
Most of these small local companies have been absorbed over the
years by larger “multi-system operators” (MSOs), such as Time War-
ner Cable, Charter, and Comcast, which may operate hundreds of
“mini-franchises” in these localities.57 This allows the cable compa
52. Evolution of Cable Television, supra note 48.
53. Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis
of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-59 (1986).
54. Overbuilding is the practice of a separate cable company laying down lines using the
same community rights of way. See generally Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, Life After Comcast:
The Economist’s Obligation to Decompose Damages Across Theories of Harm, 28 ANTITRUST
90 (2014) (discussing barriers to entry and the cost of overbuilding).
55. The primary deterrent for overbuilding is the fact that companies must absorb this
cost before they are guaranteed any customers, and there are few “new” customers in a
“mature” industry like cable. The cost to both cable companies in an area will be higher
because they will have smaller customer bases than the single cable company would. See
Dorothy Pomerantz, If You Overbuild It, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.
com/forbes/2001/0416/144.html [http://perma.cc/VGL2-Y5QV]. Despite these challenges, some
evidence suggests that not only are some companies attempting to overbuild and enter the
cable arena, but also that large cable companies are trying to keep them out. See Brodsky,
supra note 4 (explaining that Comcast and Time Warner Cable have spent money fighting
overbuilders and creating an artificially singular provision of service).
56. See Eli Noam & Robert N. Freeman, The Media Monopoly and Other Myths, 29
TELEVISION Q. 18 (1997), http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/media_monopoly.htm
[http://perma.cc/H2J8-5FH6]; see also Dibadj, supra note 33, at 265.
57. Stuart Smith, Introduction to the Cable MSO Industry, MINTEK (July 21, 2010), http://
www.mintek.com/blog/cpe-management/introduction-cable-mso-industry/ [http://perma.cc/
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nies to price their packages in each locality according to what
consumers are willing to pay, while giving them substantial nation-
al market power because they can control their corporate policies at
a national level.58 This creates an inherent problem, as federal
regulations were established to protect the monopolies of individual
cable providers, which were usually small. These cable providers
have been snapped up by the national firms, which have accumu-
lated national largesse as a result. If left unchecked by the current
legal scheme, this could allow cost increases for all customers whose
bills do not come from the largest competitor in the market,
particularly if that largest competitor has behind it the economic
power created by one of these new mergers.59
Cable regulation historically has not been particularly robust,
struggling with issues of fit in a dynamic market.60 The only regu-
lation has concerned the price of a basic cable package,61 demon-
strating that the FCC’s primary focus is consumer access to basic
channels and broadcast networks, and the presence of a “local voice”
in the community.62 The most impactful regulations are those
enforced by the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC Bureau of
Competition. These regulators administer the federal antitrust
XHU5-5PSW].
58. See Company Overview, COMCAST, http://corporate.comcast.com/news-information/
company-overview [http://perma.cc/F59X-6VGE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (describing
Comcast as “a global media and technology company,” despite the fact that its biggest
business, Comcast Cable, delivers “to residential customers”). 
59. See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining that Comcast could have forced concessions from
programming companies as a result of its greater power, and that the programming
companies in turn would use their power against smaller cable companies to charge more
than they had before).
60. See generally Dibadj, supra note 33, at 250; Hazlett, supra note 16.
61. Regulation of Cable TV Rates, FCC (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/guides/
regulation-cable-tv-rates [http://perma.cc/88NV-4FTY]. 
62. This is not necessarily a bad thing. During periods when cable prices were
unregulated, they rose, but so did the provision of better channels like HBO and ESPN, and
the actual price per channel of a cable package went down. During periods of regulation, the
price remained the same. Not only did cable development stagnate during these periods, but
the most desirable offerings—such as HBO—were moved off of the basic cable package and
into premium packages. This means that now, the broadcast networks and local channels are
some of the only offerings available to consumers under a regulated basic package, but the
amount of money and time Americans spend on cable suggests that they receive substantial
value from these packages—they want to pay for HBO. See generally Evolution of Cable
Television, supra note 48.
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statutes,63 which originally rose during the era of Standard Oil and
railroad cartels in order to keep companies from creating a monop-
oly that restrained trade.64 In furtherance of these laws, regulators
not only watch for agreements or conduct between two or more
companies that restrain trade,65 but also review mergers to assess
whether they will enhance or restrain competition.66 
2. Antitrust Oversight of Cable
Antitrust laws provide the most robust means for regulating a
cable company’s size, but, as is the case with all federal merger ap-
provals,  the way the merging companies and regulators define the
relevant market determines whether regulators will allow the com-
panies to merge. When companies plan to merge, they usually must
file paperwork with federal authorities under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act, which amended the Clayton Antitrust Act.67 The DOJ or FTC
then use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to accurately
measure the merger’s effect on market concentration. The HHI pro-
vides a number between 0 and 10,000 for market concentration,
with higher numbers demonstrating greater market power in fewer
hands.68 Regulators have termed markets between 0 and 1500
points “not concentrated,” markets between 1500 and 2500 “moder-
63. The three primary statutes are the: (1) Sherman Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 107-203,
26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)), which prohibited
businesses from engaging in anti-competitive conduct; (2) Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No.
63-323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012) and 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52-53 (2012)), which first established provisions for the government to block mergers; and
(3) Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012)), which established the FTC. 
64. See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911)
(introducing the “three evils” of monopolies the public cried out against at English common
law: higher prices, reduced output, and reduced quality).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012). 
66. Id. § 18. 
67. Id. § 18a.
68. Market concentration “is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm compet-
ing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers.” Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
DOJ: ANTITRUST DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html [http:// perma
.cc/3B5Q-9WZ8] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). For example, for a market in which there are
four firms with market shares of 30 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent, and 20 percent, respec-
tively, the HHI would be calculated as follows: 302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 900 + 900 + 400 + 400
= 2600. Id. Thus, the HHI would be 2600, making this a highly concentrated market. Id.
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ately concentrated,” and markets over 2500 points “highly concen-
trated.”69 In determining whether a merger is concerning enough to
give rise to suit, the DOJ and FTC consider both (1) whether the
market is already highly concentrated and (2) how much the merger
would increase market concentration.70 For instance, an increase of
more than 200 points in a highly concentrated market is “presumed
to be likely to enhance market power.”71 In less concentrated mar-
kets, regulators look for a greater increase in market concentration
before they are concerned.72
Federal policy does not inhibit firms from combining, except when
the new firm could unreasonably restrain trade.73 For instance, reg-
ulators famously blocked AT&T’s attempted purchase of T-Mobile
out of concern that the merger would take away a valuable competi-
tor in an already concentrated market and essentially allow a
“duopoly”74 between AT&T and Verizon.75 However, regulators often
approve mergers with certain requirements, such as divestiture of
some of the merged company’s assets. When American Airlines
merged with U.S. Airways, for example, it divested itself of some of
its gates and flights at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
because the combined company would have had an inordinate
presence compared to other airlines.76
69. Id.
70. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 7. 
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id.
73. See generally id. (discussing the lack of concern for mergers in less concentrated
markets). 
74. Just as in a monopoly where one company controls most of the market, a duopoly
exists where two companies effectively control the market. See George J. Stigler, Notes on the
Theory of Duopoly, 48 J. POL. ECON. 521, 521 (1940).
75. See Michael J. de la Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-
mobile/ [http://perma.cc/2V2A-EHCJ] (explaining that AT&T and Verizon Wireless would
have had almost three-quarters of the cellular market between them if AT&T had absorbed
T-Mobile).
76. Ashley Halsey III, American Airlines Ends Direct Service to 17 Cities from National
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The whole battle of a merger is often won and lost over the defini-
tion of the market itself.77 Companies seeking a merger generally
argue that they are members of a larger market in order to increase
the number of players, decrease the market concentration, and win
when the DOJ performs its HHI calculations.78 Regulators for the
DOJ or FTC who want to block the merger will define the market as
narrowly as possible, amplifying the effect of the proposed merger.79
The DOJ Antitrust Division uses the HHI to measure cable market-
to-market,80 because each franchise exists in its own mini-market
with its own natural monopoly.81 Cable companies are frequently
the only provider in their respective market.82 For instance, when
advocating for the Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger, Comcast
Vice President David Cohen correctly stated that “Time Warner and
Comcast do not compete in any relevant market,” such that any
consumer who paid Time Warner Cable would simply just start
paying Comcast post-merger, since Comcast was never a player in
their market to begin with.83 To put it succinctly, where there was
never substantial competition to begin with, a merger between two
cable companies cannot make such competition worse, which the-
77. See THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 26-29; see also Baker & Bresnahan,
supra note 14, at 7.
78. See Jon Brodkin, Comcast: Without Time Warner, We Can’t Compete Against Google,
Netflix, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 8, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/
comcast-without-time-warner-cable-we-cant-compete-against-google-netflix/ [http://perma.cc/
T5FE-VJD9] (noting Comcast’s statement to the FCC that, in addition to competing against
other cable companies, its relevant market includes Google, Netflix, Verizon, Apple, and
Sony).
79. Federal regulators have not yet indicated how they would define the market, but
another example would be the airline industry: regulators typically do not include train and
bus travel as adequate “substitutes” for airline travel, which would otherwise define the
market for national travel more broadly, making the airline merger less impactful. See, e.g.,
Complaint at 10, United States v. US Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 13-cv-
1236).
80. Kevin Roose, This Math Formula Shows Why the Comcast-Time Warner Cable Deal
Should Be Blocked, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:59 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2014/02/why-comcasttime-warner-cable-should-be-blocked.html [http://perma.cc/8AN7-AX7X].
Roose notes that the telco industry has also argued that it should be considered market-to-
market. Id. 
81. See supra Part I.A.
82. Dibadj, supra note 33; see also Comcast and Time Warner Cable in Top 50 TV Markets,
supra note 17; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83. Why the Feds Won’t Be Able to Block a Comcast-Time Warner Merger, supra note 15.
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oretically quashes any possible checks inherent in antitrust doc-
trine. 
C. Comcast-Time Warner Cable and Future Mergers
The aborted merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable
would have allowed the single largest cable provider in the U.S. (23
million customers) to merge with the second largest provider (11
million customers).84 Comcast had agreed to divest itself of 3 million
customers as part of the arrangement, meaning the merged com-
pany would have had just over 30 million subscribers.85 This would
have given Comcast control of one-third of all U.S. cable subscribers,
while the second-largest, Cox Communications, would have had just
5 percent of subscribers.86 A Comcast-Time Warner Cable company
would have dwarfed all others, serving twenty of the top twenty-five
markets nationwide.87
The aborted merger should have set off major alarm bells for
regulators.88 Rough estimates demonstrate that the merger would
have increased market concentration by over 500 HHI points, up to
an HHI score of 2454—almost to the DOJ’s 2500 threshold delineat-
84. See Leichtman Research Grp., supra note 7; see also Brian Stelter, Comcast Buys Time
Warner Cable for $45 Billion, CNN MONEY (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://money.cnn.
com/2014/02/13/technology/comcast-time-warner-cable-deal/ [http://perma.cc/HR5E-9TY5].
85. Stelter, supra note 84. This arrangement was designed to appease regulators, but
there is little to bind Comcast long-term, and it is unlikely, given their past history of
concessions, that they will voluntarily bind themselves long-term. See infra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text.
86. George Winslow, The Top 20 Multichannel Providers, MULTICHANNEL (Aug. 6, 2012,
12:01 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/news/cable-operators/top-20-multichannel-providers/
326351 [http://perma.cc/2TE4-36SP] (citing statistics compiled by the consultancy SNL
Kagan).
87. Turn It Off: American Regulators Should Block Comcast’s Proposed Deal with Time
Warner Cable, ECONOMIST (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21598997-
american-regulators-should-block-comcasts-proposed-deal-time-warner-cable-turn-it [http://
perma.cc/6DLN-C9QR].
88. Importantly, the DOJ never actually had to reveal its exact position on the merger,
as it was the FCC’s proposed order for a hearing that would have delayed the merger far
enough into the future that it became unpalatable for Comcast and Time Warner Cable to
continue. See Roger Yu & Mike Snider, How Comcast, Time Warner Cable Deal Unraveled,
USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/04/24/how-
comcast-deal-to-buy-time-warner-cable-fell-apart/26313471/ [http://perma.cc/9YR6-L2MN]
(quoting antitrust attorney Amanda Wait as stating that “the DoJ got the FCC to do the dirty
work here.... The DoJ never had to show their hand”).
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ing highly concentrated industries.89 By all calculations, such an
increase should essentially have mandated that the government
block any such merger—if they measured the merger nationally.
Although the merger was called off and the two largest competitors
did not merge, Charter Communications quickly stepped into the
breach to make its own bid for Time Warner Cable and another
provider, which would make the post-merger Charter a close second
in size to Comcast nationwide.90 This merger activity seems poised
to continue, so regulators will still have to confront the state of anti-
trust doctrine as it applies to cable mergers, which is the focus of
the next Part.
II. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT MEASURES
A. In Search of a Limiting Principle
The fundamental problem with cable growth is that, without a
measure that tracks the company’s national footprint, and concomi-
tantly, without a legal mechanism to address this growth, cable
company growth has no limiting principle.91 If all that matters is
that a company does not create less competition in any one locality,
a single large cable company could theoretically expand to merge
with every cable provider that serves customers in an area in which
it does not. A ruling from a D.C. Circuit case interpreting rulemak-
ing by the FCC nominally limits Comcast to a 60 percent market
share,92 but even a company half this size has the potential to
dominate the cable industry.93 
National cable companies now control most local monopolies and
operate these franchises individually only with regards to pricing
for consumers: each cable company acts mostly as a national
89. Tim Fernholz, Why the Time Warner-Comcast Merger Isn’t Going to Happen—At Least
the Way It Looks Today, QUARTZ (Feb. 13, 2014), http://qz.com/177162/why-the-time-warner-
comcast-merger-isnt-going-to-happen-at-least-the-way-it-looks-today/ [http://perma.cc/4BC2-
TGKG].
90. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
91. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 21, at 2. 
92. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
93. See infra Part III.A. Under federal antitrust laws, as long as a merger does not “un-
reasonably restrain trade,” there is no clear limit to how much of the national market a cable
company can have.
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company, not a collection of local ones.94 Moreover, there are few
contractual remedies to limit these companies’ growth. In present-
ing its merger with Time Warner Cable to the DOJ, Comcast agreed
to divest itself of 3 million of its own customers to other cable
companies,95 presumably to make the merger more palatable to
regulators.96 This arrangement mirrored Comcast’s decision when
acquiring NBC Universal in 2011 to agree to uphold the FCC’s then-
effective net neutrality rules until 2017.97 This self-imposed limit of
30 million customers would probably have expired at some point
after the merger was approved, as it is unlikely that Comcast would
have permanently limited itself to 30 million customers. After all,
a corporation could not guarantee continued growth and returns to
its stockholders if it limited itself from growing permanently.98
Therefore, not only does a limiting principle not apply to companies
like Charter Communications, but it would not have applied even
to Comcast after a certain point. Regulators are unlikely to be able
to contract out of this issue, which would primarily impact the other
side of the market: programming companies.
94. See Company Overview, supra note 58.
95. Ryan Lawler, Comcast and Time Warner Cable to Divest 3.9 Million Subscribers
Through Charter Deal, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 28, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/28/
comcast-twc-charter/ [http://perma.cc/2W5M-G9RD]. Time Warner would give Charter 1.4
million customers, Time Warner and Charter would “trade” about 1.6 million customers to
increase Charter’s overall geographic reach, and Comcast would spin off 2.5 million customers
into a new company, two-thirds of which Comcast would own and one-third of which Charter
would own. Id.
96. See Comcast Offers to Divest Customers to Win TWC Approval, CNBC (Apr. 28,
2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/28/comcast-strikes-deals-to-divest-39-million-
subscribers.html [http://perma.cc/DV3R-2KSV].
97. See Emily Siner, How the Big Cable Deal Could Actually Boost Open-Internet Rules,
NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltech
considered/2014/02/13/276453747/how-the-big-cable-deal-could-actually-boost-open-internet-
rules [http://perma.cc/X3H4-UEWM]. Courts have since struck down these rules. See Verizon
v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because Comcast contracted with the FCC to abide
by the rules, however, they remain in effect with regards to Comcast, and any Time Warner
Cable customers it picks up in the merger through 2017. See Siner, supra.
98. Comcast ultimately is beholden to its shareholders and would be leaving profits on the
table by permanently limiting its growth. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668,
684 (Mich. 1919) (establishing the principle that, generally, a company’s duty is to maximize
shareholder value).
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B. Tales from the Other Side
Many early responders focused on the costs the Comcast-Time
Warner merger would extract from consumers,99 but no cable com-
pany would practically be able to raise the price on its customers
without risking losing those customers.100 The true cost of a merger
between such large cable companies would probably be to program-
ming companies, the other side of the cable market. Cable is a
classic example of the two-sided market, meaning that cable com-
panies both transact with programming companies (nationally) and
deliver their product to consumers (locally).101 If there is no check on
the cable companies, they will gain national power and a much
stronger bargaining position with programming companies. If a
cable company like Comcast had been allowed to merge with Time
Warner Cable, it would have represented a full one-third of all U.S.
cable customers—and the most lucrative one-third of those custom-
ers, given that it would have controlled twenty of the top twenty-five
99. See, e.g., Join the Fight to Stop the Comcast-Time Warner Cable Merger, FREE PRESS,
http://www.freepress.net/resource/105883/join-fight-stop-comcast-time-warner-cable-merger
[http://perma.cc/JUG3-S8MZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
100. See Matt Richtel & Brian Stelter, In the Living Room, Hooked on Pay TV, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/business/media/23couch.html [http://
perma.cc/95TH-AFG9] (quoting Comcast CEO Brian L. Roberts describing cable-only cus-
tomers as “very price-sensitive,” meaning they react strongly to changes in price). Much has
been made of the increase in cable “cord cutters,” the industry colloquialism for those who,
while not actually cutting their cable cords, forego cable and instead rely primarily on
Internet streaming video services for their entertainment. See, e.g., Timothy Stenovec, Yes,
Netflix and Hulu Are Starting to Kill Cable, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:44 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/netflix-cable_n_5168725.html [http://perma.cc/
226B-BFXY]. This is somewhat misleading, as the true cost may be borne in younger
customers who become accustomed to living without cable, choosing “over the top” video
services like Apple TV or Google Chromecast, rather than current cable customers choosing
to “cut the cord.” See Joan E. Solsman, Cord-Cutter Wannabes Are Still a Small Group, but
Growing, CNET (Sept. 10, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/cord-cutter-wannabes-
are-still-a-small-group-but-growing/ [http://perma.cc/4B3M-EC6V]. This is in part because of
the careful dance cable companies have undertaken to make sure that they do not raise prices
on consumers past their willingness to pay, and why customers enter their zip code in order
to get the price of a cable package that “their” market will bear. The chance, therefore, that
an enlarged company is suddenly able to charge these customers more, without losing their
business, remains unlikely. Additionally, most cord-cutting customers will continue to need
internet service, which most often comes from their cable provider.
101. See Mark Armstrong, Two-Sided Markets: Economic Theory and Policy Implications,
in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 39 (Jay Pil Choi ed., 2007).
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markets.102 Cable companies of this size would have substantial
leverage over Disney, for instance, which owns ESPN. The merged
Comcast could have decided it wanted to pay less to purchase
ESPN103 for its customers in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles,
and would have had a fairly good chance of extracting money from
ESPN by threatening to cut off customers in these markets. As will
be explained herein, the negotiations then become a matter of which
company can outlast the other.104 
Laissez-faire economic markets only work when each player is a
price taker.105 When there are many players in the market, each of
whom is fairly similar to one another, they are forced to take the
prices set by the market, rather than set the prices themselves.106 If,
on the other hand, a company is able to affirmatively set its own
prices, regardless of the actions of consumers or their competitors,
they are beholden to no one, and the theory of perfect competition
breaks down.107 A large enough cable company could have the power
to dictate pricing terms to programming companies such as Viacom,
the Walt Disney Company, News Corp., Time Warner, and CBS.108
102. Turn It Off, supra note 87.
103. See Ross & Maglio, supra note 23 (noting ESPN’s high cost per subscriber).
104. The fact that Comcast depends on subscribers for its income, rather than advertisers,
as its programming counterparts do, would give it substantial leverage allowing it to weather
the storm of public opinion much longer. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
105. Perfect Competition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/perfectcom
petition.asp [http://perma.cc/PM73-SKYZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (explaining the concept
of price takers). In the economic ideal of perfect competition, all sellers in the market should
be “price takers,” meaning they all buy and sell products at the same equilibrium price. When
there are 1000 firms that all sell the same widget and buy the same parts to make it, no one
can truly charge more than the other 999 because customers will buy from any number of
them—the firms all “take” the same price at which they buy and sell. When one of these 1000
sellers is more powerful than the others and can dictate what this equilibrium price is, raising
it without customers being able to buy from the other 999, there are serious theoretical and
real-world economic problems. See WAYNE C. CURTIS, MICROECONOMIC CONCEPTS FOR
ATTORNEYS 9-10 (1984).
106. CURTIS, supra note 105, at 9-10.
107. Marginal Revenue Under Single-Pricing, LIVING ECON., http://livingeconomics.org/
article.asp?docId=319 [http://perma.cc/Z46M-89V5] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
108. Viacom owns over 160 cable channels including MTV, VH1, Nickelodeon, Comedy
Central, and Spike TV. Who Owns the Media?, FREE PRESS, http://www.freepress.net/
ownership/chart [http://perma.cc/2HMT-9KSH] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). Walt Disney
Company owns EPSN, Disney, ABC Family, and minority stakes in A&E, Lifetime, and the
History Channel. Id. News Corp. owns FOX, Fox News, and twenty-five other cable channels.
Id. Holding power over these entities is the ball game for cable.
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The company could, for instance, decide that it no longer liked the
idea of paying $5.54 per customer to ESPN,109 one of the highest
cable rates. The cable company would thus have the power to shut
out sports fans.
Comcast-Time Warner Cable would have represented over a third
of the nationwide customer base, and a merger between Charter and
Time Warner Cable would give the merged company close to a
quarter of customers nationwide—if negotiations with programming
companies break in a way that the cable company does not find
favorable, it could simply black out that station to its customers.
Even if the cable company were to lose in the court of public opinion
and take the lion’s share of the blame for the blackout, it still de-
pends primarily on cable subscribers for its revenues, rather than
advertisers.110 If the top markets cannot watch ESPN, for example,
its advertisers will walk away more quickly than the cable com-
pany’s customers.111 Cable has spent a lot of time and money to lock
consumers into its ecosystem: consumers have a difficult time
switching proprietary cable boxes, incur costs in switching to satel-
lite, and, because of the buy-in they have already made with the
company, are simply less likely to walk away from their cable com-
pany over what they perceive as a temporary blackout.112 If a cable
company controls some geographic areas, but not all, and if pro-
gramming companies know they are dealing with several different
109. Ross & Maglio, supra note 23.
110. Tasneem Chipty & Christopher M. Snyder, The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bar-
gaining: A Study of the Cable Television Industry, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 326, 333 (1999)
(calculating the profit functions of programming companies based almost entirely on their
income from advertisers, and noting that, although other revenue represents a growing por-
tion of their revenue, “advertising revenue continues to be the largest portion of supplier
revenue”).
111. Hazlett, supra note 16, at 65 n.222 (defining elasticity of demand as the percentage
change in quantity demanded for a percentage change in price). Although cable customers are
somewhat demand-elastic, meaning they respond to price changes, they are not as sensitive
as advertisers. See Steven C. Salop et al., Economic Analysis of Broadcasters’ Brinkmanship
and Bargaining Advantages in Retransmission Consent Negotiations 31 n.60 (Time Warner,
Working Paper, 2010), http://97.74.209.146/downloads/broadcaster_brinkmanship.pdf [http://
perma.cc/YDH3-ZU9Y] (discussing how advertisers will depart from cable much more quickly
than customers).
112. Andrew S. Wise & Kiran Duwadi, Competition Between Cable Television and Direct
Broadcast Satellite—It’s More Complicated than You Think 1 (FCC Media Bureau Staff,
Working Paper No. 2005-1, 2005), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-255869
A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/DYK3-EDTP].
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MSOs with about the same power nationwide, that begins to look
like a fair market.113 But there is little chance programming
companies can afford to face off against the largesse of a sufficiently
big cable company without harming their profits.
It seems obvious, then, that the typical response from most pro-
gramming companies would be to merge themselves.114 If Comcast-
Time Warner Cable had wanted to use its 30 million subscribers as
its ammunition, a Disney Company merged with Viacom could
threaten to cut families off from ESPN, VH1, TLC, and Nickelodeon
all at once. If the whole family is missing their favorite channels,
they will be quicker to call DirecTV, and this will look more like a
competitive market. Herein lies the other side of the coin that
result’s from cable’s lack of a limiting principle.
C. Programmers Are Limited by Antitrust Law
1. Legal Limitations
When faced with this scenario, most programming companies are
likely to consider mergers to increase their own size, and, conse-
quently, their nationwide negotiating power. It is unclear that they
may do so, but it is not for lack of trying. Rupert Murdoch an-
nounced that his 21st Century Fox proposed to acquire Time
Warner, Inc. over the summer of 2014.115 Although Time Warner
ultimately rejected Murdoch’s advances, critics were nearly unani-
mous in their position that the merger would have created antitrust
issues for regulators by concentrating too much media in the hands
of one company. This is because programming companies are mea-
sured nationally, and if they were measured locally, Time Warner’s
products compete in every local market with those of 21st Century
Fox—most cable packages actually group CNN and Fox News near
113. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. 
114. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 51.
115. Time Warner, Inc. is a separate entity from Time Warner Cable. Time Warner, Inc.
owns Warner Brothers Television, the CW Network, TBS, TNT, Cartoon Network, and HBO.
See Who Owns the Media?, supra note 108. All future references to “Time Warner” concern
Time Warner, Inc., while the company involved in cable acquisition continues to be referred
to as “Time Warner Cable.”
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one another.116 The combination of the two companies would have
given 21st Century Fox control over a substantial portion of the pay
cable packages, and thus they would probably have too much lever-
age over cable providers.117 This is not to suggest that regulators
counter cable company mergers by allowing programmers to bulk up
as well; the regulations currently in place to limit this growth are
there for a good reason and should remain in place. On the contrary,
cable companies should be held to the same standard, not handed
a loophole by virtue of having separate franchises in each market. 
Given that there is an increasingly small contingent of major
television and movie studios,118 the market is already what regula-
tors would call “highly concentrated.”119 Since it is so concentrated,
regulators are much more likely to scrutinize a programming mer-
ger and sue to block it because it harms competition in the national
market. Current programmers would thus be locked into their
current sizes, while cable companies could be allowed virtually
unlimited growth nationwide.
The real fear, however, stems from the belief that the market
operates best when these two sides compete on a fair playing field
against one another to provide the lowest cost and the highest level
of service for their customers. This is the accidental enshrinement
of unfairness mentioned in the Introduction. Federal antitrust law
tends to favor cable companies because the rights of way awarded
to cable companies—which created a natural monopoly—were in-
tended for small providers, not national conglomerates. This has
granted these cable companies exceptional power over the other
116. See, e.g., Ryan Chittum, Murdoch Moves on Time Warner, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(July 17, 2014, 4:04 PM), http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/murdoch_and_time_warner.php [http://
perma.cc/3HXV-72CC] (noting in its secondary headline that “[a]s pipes companies merge,
another round of media consolidation [begins]”); Michael Liedtke, 21st Century Fox Abandons
Pursuit of Time Warner, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 5, 2014, 10:26 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/21st-century-fox-abandons-pursuit-time-warner [http://perma.cc/88D6-M6JL]; Andrew
Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Murdoch Puts Time Warner on His Wish List, N.Y.
TIMES (July 16, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/rupert-murdoch-said-
to-have-made-offer-for-time-warner/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/TV5B-8JPA] (noting that Murdoch
did plan to spin off CNN, a Time Warner-owned station, to another company in order to avoid
antitrust concerns, particularly because of the influence of his own Fox News).
117. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 21, at 4.
118. Who Owns the Media?, supra note 108.
119. See supra Part I.B.2.
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market players and programmers, who, by these same laws, cannot
combine to become much larger than they already are.
2. Two Sets of Losers, Two Doctrines Lost 
Why should consumers and regulators fear this result? After all,
the very definition of a natural monopoly means that it may in fact
be economically more efficient for everyone to get their cable from
one enormous company.120 However, even if consumers do not feel
the full brunt of the effects for some time, the approval of the mer-
ger of large cable companies could have far-ranging consequences
for antitrust and telecommunications (telco) mergers. Economic
regulatory theory recognizes two principal and competing goals:
efficiency and equity.121 Regulators are constantly trying to ensure
that markets run as efficiently as possible. This means they want to
reach “equilibrium,” the point at which the cost to the producer of
producing each additional unit (“marginal cost”) is equal to the
benefit of that unit to the consumer (“marginal benefit”), such that
everyone who values an item at or above the marginal cost will buy
the product, and others will not. Everyone is happy, either buying
or not buying based on their prerogative.122 
At the same time, other regulators would structure for maximum
equity.123 The degree to which a consumer’s marginal benefit ex-
ceeds what they paid for an item is called their “surplus.” Producers
also have surplus, the degree to which they can sell a product for
more than it costs to produce. There is a “total surplus” calculating
the surplus across all consumers and producers.124 Equity is the
distribution of this surplus—who benefits more and who benefits
less when prices are lower than value, or prices are higher than
what it costs the producer to sell it.125 Cable regulations allow a
sufficiently large company to ignore both of these prerogatives, and
consumers and programmers would pay for it.
120. See supra Part I.A. 
121. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Effi-
ciency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191-92 (1977); see also supra Part I.A.
122. SAUL ESTRIN ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 3-5 (5th ed. 2008).
123. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 45, at 37-38.
124. See ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 88 (12th ed. 2014). 
125. Id. at 74-76.
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A cable merger thus has the potential to create two sets of losers:
other cable industry competitors would lose because programming
companies, as explained below, are not going to absorb the costs the
larger company extracts from them, so they are going to pass them
along to smaller, weaker cable companies. Programming companies
are also going to lose because not all market players will be price
takers.126 From an equity standpoint, one cable company could con-
trol 20 million subscribers, controlling the way that almost a quar-
ter of the country accesses cable.127 If a merged company is able to
force lower prices on programmers, programmers will pass this cost
on to all smaller cable providers, who will in turn pass those costs
on to their consumers. Any customer not within the service area of
the largest competitor will likely pay more in the long term for their
cable, by virtue of their provider being a fraction of the size of the
biggest players. Furthermore, the largest cable companies are not
likely to pass their own gains on to their customers128—their prices
will remain the same, with the company pocketing the money it
receives as profit.129 Such a merger thus also threatens efficiency.
Current laws do not seem to limit the size of cable providers at all,
but national content providers are limited by traditional antitrust
doctrine, keeping them from competing with cable companies that
may, by law, grow unchecked. This does not ensure that all firms in
the market are price takers, which is economists’ goal for antitrust
law.130
126. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
127. Comcast and Time Warner Cable Transaction Fact Sheet, supra note 1. 
128. Spencer Woodman, Exclusive: Politicians Are Supporting Comcast’s TWC Merger with
Letters Ghostwritten by Comcast, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.theverge.com/
2015/1/26/7878239/comcast-twc-fcc-merger-letters-politicians-ghostwritten [http://perma.cc/
3Y57-7WS9] (quoting Columbia University Law Professor Tim Wu that, in the case of the
Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger, “Comcast could have said this merger will lower prices
and committed itself to lower prices but it has made no sign that it will do this”). 
129. Of course, each negotiation between a programming company and a cable provider
over rates will lead to slightly different outcomes for consumers—there is nothing to guaran-
tee that a programming company gives the same price to each cable company. Nor should
there be; that is properly within the realm of negotiation. This Note will demonstrate,
however, that there is a substantive difference in the negotiating power of an entity like the
merged Comcast and another like Cox, which has one-sixth as many customers.
130. Elzinga, supra note 121 (discussing economists’ goal of maximizing efficiency, which
results in maximizing total output). 
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This is the heart of Carl Chicago and Wendy Williamsburg’s hypo-
thetical problem. Wendy is served by Cox Communications, while
Carl is a Comcast customer. If Comcast had merged, it would have
been able to extract higher gains for itself in the form of profit. Carl
would not see any of this money but, as a result, he would have
experienced the ups and downs of negotiations on Comcast’s terms.
Wendy’s cable provider, on the other hand, does not have the power
to negotiate these terms, so she has all of the channels, but her
cable company has to pay more for the profits Comcast extracts from
CNN and Cartoon Network. Even though the Comcast-Time Warner
Cable merger did not come to pass, this remains an enforcement
loophole. Regulators ought to consider cable’s national power to pre-
vent customers from experiencing such wildly different results
based on where they live. 
III. THE DOJ MUST MEASURE BOTH CABLE MONOPOLY AND
MONOPSONY WHEN CALCULATING THE HHI (AND REJECT A
MERGER EXCEEDING EITHER THRESHOLD)
The lack of adequate legal enforcement to stop current mergers
is concerning. Beyond a few limited FCC rules, the lack of any
future limiting principle to keep operators from expanding nation-
ally is potentially disastrous.131 Our procompetitive antitrust laws
are the best defense against these anticompetitive practices. 
This Note therefore proposes that the DOJ analyze cable, a two-
sided market, by performing two HHI analyses. The first analysis
would compare the market for cable delivery to consumers market-
to-market. The second would have regulators, for the first time,
consider the impact of the cable merger on buyer power over pro-
gramming content nationally, by determining whether the merger
would give the company monopsony power over programming
companies. If either of these HHI analyses indicates that competi-
tion would decrease as a result of the merger, the DOJ should sue
to block the merger.
One of the chief benefits of this plan is that it should be feasible
to implement without new authority from Congress; the DOJ has
131. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (establishing the only current
limit on a cable company’s national market share at 60 percent).
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the authority to decide how to measure the markets, and what mar-
kets to consider.132 The dual analyses do not depend on one another
per se. They merely consider for the first time the impact of any
cable merger on both sides of the market. The DOJ conducts sep-
arate market analyses for each, and then may draw its own conclu-
sions about whether to grant approval or sue to block. This, of
course, would not necessarily stop a merger. As discussed above in
relation to the AT&T-T-Mobile and American-US Airways merg-
ers,133 litigation follows a DOJ lawsuit just as often as settlement or
abandonment of the merger attempt. No plan is foolproof, but this
proposal helps ensure that the DOJ has the ability to consider all
potential market impacts when evaluating a cable merger. 
A. The Legal Authority
Monopoly laws are in place to prevent anticompetitive practices
by firms134 as well as mergers that will restrain competition in an
industry.135 The Clayton Antitrust Act, as amended by the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act,136 prohibits any merger from taking place if it
would substantially reduce competition in any one market,137 as
measured by the HHI described above. Competitive advantages giv-
en to large cable conglomerates, but disallowed to their strongest
market opponents, ought to be considered to violate the antitrust
laws for several reasons. 
First, there could never be any effective competition if program-
ming companies know that they are prohibited from becoming any
larger while cable companies are essentially unlimited in their
growth.138 Second, if the most powerful cable company could dictate,
rather than merely negotiate, prices, it would be difficult for other
cable companies to retain current levels of pricing and services. The
132. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11. 
133. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
134. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012). These are also often termed practices
“in restraint of trade.”
135. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2012).
136. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (describing the application of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act in further detail).
137. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
138. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 21, at 2-3. 
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very basis for a competitive market is the idea that no single player
in the market has the ability to set prices—in other words, all
companies are “price takers.”139 Whenever one company can affect
what its competitors will pay through its own actions, it is no longer
a price taker, and the market suffers.140 Regulators need to be able
to limit such uninhibited growth, and the antitrust laws provide
them with the tools necessary to do so.
The FCC previously tried to use its own regulatory authority to
limit the growth of cable, with disastrous results. In 1992, Congress
passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act to require cable systems to carry local broadcast signals141 and
keep cable operators from charging local broadcasters to carry the
signal.142 The Act also gave the FCC the power to limit cable pro-
vider growth:
In order to enhance effective competition, the Commission shall,
within one year after October 5, 1992, conduct a proceeding—(A)
to prescribe rules and regulations establishing reasonable lim-
its on the number of cable subscribers a person is authorized to
reach through cable systems owned by such person, or in which
such person has an attributable interest.143
After cable companies challenged the Act on its face, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that the rule was content-neutral.144 The FCC soon set a
national ownership cap for cable providers at 30 percent of the
market, based on their econometric analysis that programming com-
panies needed to be able to access at least 70 percent of the market
to remain viable.145 
The FCC’s rule was purportedly based on an analysis of wheth-
er, if one or more cable providers denied access to a programming
139. ESTRIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 308.
140. Id.
141. This is called the “must-carry provision.” See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text
(discussing how cable companies are prohibited from transmitting an alternative local news
station to localities even if it is cheaper than carrying the local station’s signal).
142. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460.
143. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1) (1992).
144. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000) [here-
inafter Time Warner I].
145. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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network, it would otherwise be able to reach alternative video pro-
grammers of a sufficient size to allow it to survive in the market.146
The underlying idea was to ensure that “no single cable operator
‘can, by simply refusing to carry a programming network, cause it
to fail.’ ”147 The FCC was to complete this analysis by considering the
“minimum viable scale,” the number of viewers a channel needs to
remain economically viable, the total number of subscribers avail-
able in the U.S. market, and the “penetration rate,” the number of
subscribers the network will actually reach and cable providers will
allow.148
The D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC’s choice of the 30 percent cap
as “arbitrary and capricious” because it failed to take into account
the increasing popularity of satellite and telco alternatives, which
serve up to 33 percent of the market.149 The court instead proposed
a cap of up to 60 percent, based on evidence that satellite and telco
alternatives meant that programming networks needed to reach
only 40 percent of cable customers to survive and remain economi-
cally viable.150 The FCC failed to rebut this evidence.151 This elimi-
nated a 30 percent subscriber cap and enshrined, for the time being,
a subscriber cap that would have allowed Comcast to double its post-
Time Warner subscriber base without running afoul of FCC
regulations.152 
At first blush, this looks like the death knell for any arguments
that the government can regulate the size of a cable company until
it serves around 60 percent of the cable market. Upon closer inspec-
tion, though, there are two major reasons that the court’s rejection
of the FCC’s rulemaking authority should not burden rulemaking
under antitrust laws. First, the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of satellite
and telco alternatives concerned consumers’ ability to switch to
those services if cable simply refused to carry the programming. The
FCC’s central focus was not negotiations over rates between cable
and programming—it was to “ensure that no cable operator ... can
146. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter
Time Warner II].
147. Comcast Corp., 579 F.3d at 4 (citing 23 F.C.C.R. 2134, 2154 (2008)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 6-8.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id.
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unfairly impede ... the flow of video programming from the video
programmer to the consumer.”153 The FCC was concerned about a
long-term blackout used by the cable companies to choke off compet-
itors in the context of a larger bill about cable choking off the local
voice, not about cable companies trying to extract money. The
antitrust concerns focus on the competitive negotiations between
cable and programming for their share of the total surplus.
Second, much of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis turned on the Commis-
sion’s admittedly feeble analysis that satellite was not a viable
alternative to cable.154 None of this matters in addressing the
problems of negotiating power and distribution of total surplus. If
Comcast gets a reduction in the amount it pays for ESPN, all other
providers will bear these costs, whether they are a cable company
like Cox or a satellite company like Dish Network.155 There is
nowhere for consumers to run (at least those who buy a package
containing ESPN). The FCC’s analysis is largely inapposite to the
current situation, but merely represents the completeness of regula-
tors’ failure to limit cable’s rise in the past. If regulators are ever
going to limit cable’s growth, they should look once again to the




Most lay readers could be forgiven for not knowing monopsony—
when it was first proposed during the Comcast-Time Warner Cable
merger, most media treated it as a foreign concept.156 The concept
is basically the opposite of a monopoly: whereas a monopoly is
concerned with the power of a single seller over multiple buyers,
153. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(2)(A) (2012).
154. Comcast Corp., 579 F.3d at 6-7.
155. Because satellite and telco companies must also negotiate with programming com-
panies for the prices of their shows, they are price takers as well. Therefore, if Comcast can
dictate the market, but no other purchaser of programming can do so, customers at telco and
satellite companies are hurt just as much as those at smaller cable companies. 
156. See, e.g., David Ingram, Not a Typo, Monopsony in Spotlight in U.S. Cable Deal,
REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/21/us-usa-comcast-
monopsony-analysis-idUSBREA1K1VI20140221 [http://perma.cc/F3JB-NBMF]. 
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monopsony is the power of a single buyer over multiple sellers.157 A
monopsonist is able to restrict the output of their product below
competitive levels—by blacking out signal, as an example—which
gives them the leverage to lower input prices below competitive
levels as well.158
Monopsony analysis is most often conducted in two situations.
First, economists examine monopsony power in the labor context,
such as various examinations of Wal-Mart’s ability, as the dominant
employer in a local labor market, to exert wage power over workers
and artificially suppress its output of paid positions.159 Monopsony
has also been applied in agricultural contexts.160 It has never been
applied to a cable merger. In fact, relatively few mergers have ever
been challenged on the grounds that they will increase buyer pow-
er,161 and few cases have ever gotten close to a finding of monopsony
violation.162
However, the power to measure monopsony is actually present in
the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.163 More careful consid-
eration of monopsony power is a fairly recent phenomenon: while
once the DOJ-FTC merely addressed the assessment of monopsony
concerns in one short paragraph, a longer discussion of buyer power
157. Roundtable on Monopsony and Buyer Power: Note by the United States 2 (Directorate
for Fin. and Enter. Affairs Competition Comm., Working Paper, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-and-other-international-competition-
fora/monopsony.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3GX-R3TG] [hereinafter Note by the United States].
158. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 297, 305 (1991).
159. See, e.g., Alessandro Bonanno & Rigoberto A. Lopez, Wal-Mart’s Monopsony Power in
Local Labor Markets 1 (presented at the Am. Agric. Econ. Ass’n Annual Meeting, July 27-
29, 2008), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6219/2/469304.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWL9-
FA3W].
160. DOJ, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE
AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY
FORWARD 8 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/05/16/283291.pdf
[http://perma. cc/UR5E-TFCS].
161. Note by the United States, supra note 157, at 6-7.
162. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Monopsony 2013: Still Not Truly Symmetric 13-14 (presented
at the 61st Annual Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.wsgr.com/
attorneys/BIOS/PDFs/jacobson-0413.pdf [http://perma.cc/P7W6-G4TB] (noting that, with the
exception of a jury verdict sustained by the court of appeals but overturned by the Supreme
Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardware Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007), the
Court has never found a violation).
163. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 32. 
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appeared for the first time in the 2010 Guidelines.164 It is time for
the DOJ and FTC to reacquaint themselves with this doctrine to
more rigorously examine cable mergers.
2. DOJ/FTC Framework
The agencies would conduct their analysis in much the same
manner as they do for monopoly, by measuring the number of buy-
ers available to programming companies to sell their products.165 As
monopsony is in many ways the mirror image of monopoly,166 the
key definition in this case, as in all others, is the market.167 Herein
lies the benefit of monopsony measurement—the DOJ and FTC are
to include in the market definition any reasonably interchangeable
products that consumers could turn to if the buyer restricted out-
put—in this case, in the form of a cable blackout.168 Because cable
companies typically have a natural monopoly in all of the areas
where they provide to customers, consumers do not have reasonable
alternatives to cable-line programming delivery. 
A cable company might argue that the relevant geographic mar-
ket is the same as in monopoly cases—in other words, because it
does not currently compete to buy in the Chicago market with
another company it intends to merge with, its merger cannot change
this situation. However, the analysis of a monopsony measures the
number of good substitutes to which to sell from the point of view of
the sellers.169 In this case, the “relevant market” from the sellers’
point of view is all the land where the merging companies provide
service to customers. In this market, post-merger, the sellers go
from negotiating with two companies in the proposed cable coverage
164. Compare DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1 (issued Apr. 2, 1992,
revised Apr. 8, 1997), with DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 8, 12 (2010).
Section 12, on monopsony power, remains substantially shorter than portions discussing
monopoly power. Id.
165. Note that this looks substantially like the FCC rule struck down by the D.C. Circuit.
See supra Part III.A. However, the key difference is that the harm the regulators are working
to combat in this case is not the limitation of speech by a complete blackout, but the use of a
limited, short-term blackout to depress prices below cost for programming companies.
166. See Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror 4 (Univ. of Tenn.
Research & Creative Exch., Working Paper, 2013). 
167. Blair & Harrison, supra note 158, at 323-24.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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areas, to negotiating with only one in this coverage area. The
market for sale of programming in the proposed coverage area
would be the relevant market from the point of view of the program-
ming companies.
Finally, a cable company may claim that there is no need for the
regulators to concern themselves with its monopsony power, be-
cause it is traditionally understood that if it results in decreased
prices for consumers, monopsony is a good thing.170 Comcast, how-
ever, specifically noted that consumers would not receive lower
prices as a result of its merger with Time Warner Cable.171 There-
fore, any gains it would have made would have been, in part, be-
cause of its ability to extract lower prices from content providers, an
ability the combined Charter-Time Warner Cable, or any other large
MSO, could also have.172 Whether this power extends from the
competitor’s legitimate negotiating skills, or from monopsony power,
where it can decrease output in the form of a blackout to consumers,
is something the DOJ and FTC will have to measure if they take up
a torch for monopsony.
C. Balancing Efficiency and Equity
This plan achieves balance between the two primary concerns
animating all decisions by social planners and state economists—
efficiency and equity. One or the other of these concerns is the major
driver of economic policy for economists,173 and many economic
issues fail to appease both sets of interests.174 A plan that requires
the DOJ to conduct an HHI analysis for both sides of the relevant
two-sided market vindicates both concerns.
Economists who follow the efficiency model, many of whom fall
into the Chicago School,175 believe that antitrust laws exist not to
170. Ingram, supra note 156 (quoting Professor Herbert Hovenkamp’s explanation that
monopsony is only a “problem when it threatens to decrease output”).
171. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
172. As with most mergers, there would also be gains from scale and efficiency—closing
down redundant factories, combining staff, and other measures. These gains are not the focus
of this Note.
173. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 35, at 5. 
174. Id.
175. The Chicago school of economics, named because of its creation through the work of
faculty at the University of Chicago, is an economic theory that argues that free markets best
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protect consumers, but to protect competition, and that maximizing
the total surplus of the market is the most valuable and feasible
goal for social planners.176 Total surplus is maximized when consum-
ers get the most utility and producers sell at the highest price
possible.177 There has already been a demonstration of how allowing
a cable company to set what it is willing to pay will impact the
market—costs will rise for programming companies and will be
passed on to consumers at other cable companies, thus upsetting the
natural equilibrium where each person willing to sell at a certain
price matches each person willing to buy at a certain price.178 If this
match is lost, consumers who would buy cable at the ordinary price,
but not at this higher price, will opt out, decreasing total surplus.
Economists who are primarily concerned with equity do not be-
lieve that our antitrust laws merely exist to protect the market but
that the highest goal of this doctrine is consumer protection,179
ensuring that the total surplus is distributed roughly equally among
consumers.180 In this context, it is perhaps even easier to see how
the natural endpoint of the current law leaves consumers unpro-
tected. By making sure that programming companies are on roughly
the same footing, and that cable companies are in roughly the same
bargaining position, this proposal ensures that consumers nation-
wide, who do not have any realistic choices among cable companies,
will have roughly the same experience for roughly the same price.
D. The Time Is Now, Not the Future
Counterarguments and alternatives to the proposal in this Note
are not as compelling. Although there have been previous economet-
ric analyses concluding that the post-merger cable company might
allocate resources with minimal government intervention, and prizes total surplus as the
most valuable measure of economic welfare. See generally Richard Ebeling, Milton Friedman
and the Chicago School of Economics, FREEMAN (Dec. 1, 2006), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/
milton-friedman-and-the-chicago-school-of-economics [http://perma.cc/9JEW-B92Q].
176. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51, 51 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
177. Elzinga, supra note 121, at 1192-94; see also notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
179. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713-15 (1997). 
180. Elzinga, supra note 121, at 1192-94.
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be the one to lose ground, these studies are outdated and do not
resolve the fundamental equity distribution problems. Further, the
concept of a luxury tax on the post-merger profits of a cable com-
pany deemed “too large” presents line-drawing problems and puts
social planners into a dangerously active position. Finally, despite
advancements in over-the-top video alternatives like Apple TV or
Netflix, consumers still depend on cable, and would not be as
empowered to cut the cord as commentators suggest.
1. Cable Companies Will Lose Ground
Some of the most common counterarguments to putting legal
structures in place to protect consumers from the unimpeded growth
of cable fail to take into account just how unprotected the current
market is. The most comprehensive examination of cable as a two-
sided market suggests that larger cable companies will actually lose
ground when negotiating with programming providers.181 This point
requires some explanation. The traditional understanding in busi-
ness circles has been that “downstream concentration is negatively
correlated with upstream profitability.”182 This simply means that
as downstream providers, such as cable companies, become larger,
there is a negative impact on the profits that the upstream program-
ming companies see as a result.183 Tasneem Chipty and Christopher
Snyder used the profit functions of roughly twenty-one providers
over a nine-year period to estimate the impact of a cable merger on
those profit functions.184 The authors concluded that merging actual-
ly worsens the cable company’s bargaining position relative to the
programming company.185 The only reasons cable companies merge,
they argue, are for the efficiencies they gain and the money they
save—they can combine physical properties and sell unnecessary
181. Chipty & Snyder, supra note 110, at 326. 
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Douglas G. Brooks, Buyer Concentration: A Forgotten Element in Market
Structure Models, 1 INDUS. ORG. REV. 151, 160 (1973); Robert D. Buzzell et al., Market
Share— A Key to Profitability, 53 HARV. BUS. REV. 97 (1975), https://hbr.org/1975/01/market-
share-a-key-to-profitability [http://perma.cc/MQ9N-CWS9]; Steven H. Lustgarten, The Impact
of Buyer Concentration in Manufacturing Industries, 15 REV. ECON. & STAT. 125, 130-31
(1975).
184. Chipty & Snyder, supra note 110, at 328-32.
185. Id. at 337-38.
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buildings, eliminate redundant jobs, and free up those resources for
the rest of the market to use.186
There is good reason to dispute the conclusion that Chipty and
Snyder reach, or at least to doubt that it solves the problem of
growing cable companies. To begin with, they conducted the study
in 1999, using panel data187 that ended in 1992.188 At that time,
cable companies were significantly smaller than they are in 2015,
and there was more competition on the whole: there were both more
cable providers and more programming companies,189 making the
power concentration of both in relation to one another much lower.
The authors estimated that “for the bargaining effect to be positive
... cable providers would need to serve ... [at least] 39.1 million
subscribers.”190 This number may have been inconceivable in 1991,
but Comcast would have been within striking distance post-merger,
and nothing stops another company from reaching the same thresh-
old.191 Furthermore, even if Chipty & Snyder were correct, the equi-
ty concerns remain, but are just reversed. That is, if a larger
company had to pay more instead of less than other providers, and
therefore its customers paid more than the rest of the people in the
market, economists and social planners would consider this just as
unpalatable from an equity standpoint as the larger company’s
186. Id.
187. Panel data compares explanatory variables across one independent variable over a
long period of time. In this case, the cable companies’ dataset consisted of the same variables
drawn from each company over a period of between five and nine years. See generally id.
(discussing the dataset used for their study).
188. Id. at 333.
189. The authors measured twenty-one cable companies. Id.
190. Id. at 337.
191. Cox Communications has 5.91 million customers. See News Release, Cox Enter-
prises, Cox Sees Lowest Customer Churn in Its History (July 26, 2007), http://coxenterprises.
mediaroom.com/index.php?s=26244&item=67835 [http://perma.cc/KQ8W-HN94]. Charter
Communications would have had 8.2 million subscribers after the pre-merger divestitures
from Comcast and Time Warner Cable. See Cynthia Littleton, Charter to Become Second-
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customers paying less192 and other customers paying more. Whoever
pays more, they are no longer equal.
2. Line-Drawing Problems
Other counterarguments similarly fail to examine the present
nature of the cable market and the previous failures of regulation.
Commentators, such as Gary Wax, have argued that the best way
to deal with large cable companies would be to impose a luxury
tax.193 The proposal would have the FCC194 arrange to collect excess-
profits taxes from cable companies in lieu of regulation. This ap-
proach certainly has some positive attributes, particularly its
recognition of the FCC’s failure to implement effective ownership
caps. The proposal instead encourages bargaining between regula-
tors and companies that harnesses the companies’ natural inclina-
tion to expand and simply collects a (small) portion of that profit to
share with consumers.195 It also addresses Judge Posner’s argu-
ments in favor of natural monopolies, in which he opined that social
planners, lacking any real concept of economics and held sway by
third-party interests, were inadequate to determine what regulation
should attach to industries.196 
The problem with Wax’s concept is that there is no true indication
as to where the line should be drawn with regards to “excess prof-
its.” In other words, the big question would always be, “When is
Charter making outsize profits due entirely to its size, rather than
the fact that consumers demand its products?” This is a line-drawing
issue that ultimately requires the FCC to determine when size
creates such outsized profits, and when a firm might have reached
192. Bear in mind that the reference to “customers” is mere shorthand. Comcast customers
would, in all likelihood, pay the same amount they always have, with the company itself
capturing the gains. Comcast has made no representations that a merger will improve costs
for consumers. See Public Interest Benefits Summary, COMCAST, http://corporate.comcast.com/
images/Public-Interest-Benefits-Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/VNU3-AU9V] (last visited
Sept. 27, 2015). 
193. Gary Wax, Cable Company Monopoly: Comcast and Time Warner Control the Board,
28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 159, 163 (2008). 
194. The local franchising authorities would be responsible for levying the taxes, and the
money would go directly to local coffers.
195. Wax, supra note 193, at 202.
196. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 549-50
(1969).
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that size through vigorous competition—the exact same threshold
deemed “arbitrary and capricious” by the D.C. Circuit.197 Deciding
that something is “too big” or too anti-competitive to survive also
goes against the HHI analysis the regulators perform on every
merger; if a firm could be deemed too large per se, the DOJ and FTC
would never have used the HHI in the first place.
3. “Would it be so bad?” Counterarguments
Other commentators argue that, were the worst to pass and were
cable to become a product consumers were sufficiently unhappy
with, they would have ample opportunities to switch to other op-
tions—telco and satellite alternatives,198 over-the-top devices like
the Apple TV or Google’s Chromecast, and the myriad streaming
options available on most personal computers.199 These options are
simply not replacements. Cable retains advantages, such as the
solicitude of the local franchising authority, and an incumbency of-
ten supported by local franchising laws and requirements that
protect cable (as opposed to the alternatives discussed above).200
Satellite and telco will never enjoy these advantages, and their
customers would lose just as much if a merged company forced
ESPN to raise prices on its competitors. 
An over-the-top provision is also not a cure-all. Cable companies
have worked hard to keep streaming companies and products from
getting access to sports programming, one of the most lucrative and
widely viewed cable products.201 The late-breaking introduction of
streaming applications by some of the strongest players—the cable
stations HBO and Showtime, and the broadcast network CBS—that
197. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 3 (2009).
198. Manne, supra note 19. 
199. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Getting Rid of TV: The Smartest Ways to Cut the Cord,
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2014, 9:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/getting-rid-of-cable-tv-the-
smartest-ways-to-cut-the-cord-1405472757 [http://perma.cc/284Z-BWPX] (recommending that
consumers purchase a home antenna and position it towards broadcast towers or take part
in “login borrowing,” the practice of more than one household illegally sharing one user’s
credentials for a service like HBO Go).
200. See Hazlett, supra note 16, at 9-10.
201. Chris Welch, The NFL Is Finally Coming to Apple TV, but Not How You Want It,
VERGE (Aug. 4, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/4/5967123/nfl-finally-
coming-to-apple-tv [http://perma.cc/J3ZX-CK4D]. 
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may be purchased without a cable subscription202 will surely delight
some fans. This has long been hailed as the beginning of the end for
cable, or at least the beginning of a shift of power back into consum-
ers’ hands.203
However, not only is it too early to determine these effects, but
one of the unspoken truths about cable packages versus à la carte
programming purchases is that channels like HBO actually sub-
sidize less popular but no less necessary cable channels such as the
Discovery Channel, A&E, and the National Geographic Channel.
Before Walter White, AMC’s most profitable character was probably
Michael Myers, and its Halloween marathons, although perhaps not
a national treasure, probably deserve a space in the cable landscape
that will be effectively lost if consumers can begin to pay for HBO
on its own. For consumers with wide-ranging tastes, the cost of
these bundles may quickly add up to a cable subscription. The an-
swer must come from within the current cable structure, not outside
of it.
CONCLUSION
The Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger is no more, but no
sooner did that deal fail than Charter Communications began its
own bid for Time Warner Cable. It is clear that the merger between
massive cable MSOs is now the order of the day, particularly in an
era when they feel squeezed on several fronts by new competitors in
smaller black boxes. 
The average consumer probably does not think much about how
they receive their cable, probably not any more than Carl and
Wendy do until they are actually on the phone with one another.
But over 100 million Americans receive cable, and they spend a
substantial amount of time watching it.204 Future cable mergers are
202. See Emily Steel, Cord-Cutters Rejoice: CBS Joins Web Stream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/business/cbs-to-offer-web-subscription-service.html
[http://perma.cc/8JKE-VCHU]. 
203. See Brian Merchant, HBO Finally Killed Cable, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 15, 2014, 3:26
PM), http:// motherboard.vice.com/read/hbo-killed-cable [http://perma.cc/RMW4-PQRA].
204. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY SUMMARY (2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm [http://perma.cc/V3PN-VBBQ] (indicating that
Americans spend about 2.8 hours per day watching TV, the leisure activity that took up the
most time).
2015] MEASURING MONOPSONY 339
going to impact all of these households whether they understand
them or not, and it is not at all clear that federal regulation is ade-
quately prepared for the long-term consequences of measuring cable
companies market-to-market. This strategy has no clear end point
for the size of Charter, Comcast, or any other cable company. It
risks throwing the cable world into one in which the largest provider
can extract money from programming companies, which comes out
of the pockets of those under lesser rule. 
The DOJ and FTC must take this opportunity to change their
measures for the future. It is too difficult to say whether Charter-
Time Warner Cable, measured nationally, would clear the threshold
of the HHI such that regulators would sue to block a similar merger
under this new rule; it is entirely possible that they could both
approve the merger and amend their market measurement process.
Whatever they do, however, they must do with the understanding
that consumer news, entertainment, and culture depend on their
next move. 
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